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ABSTRACT 
The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly* 
by Roman Inderst and Christian Wey 
This paper presents a model of takeover incentives in an oligopolistic industry, which, 
in contrast to previous approaches, takes both insiders' and outsiders' gains from an 
increase in industry concentration into account. Our main application is to compare 
takeover incentives in a differentiated Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly model with 
linear demand and costs. We provide a complete analysis for arbitrary numbers of firms, 
complements and substitutes, and degrees of product differentiation. An increase in 
concentration is more likely under Cournot competition if products are complements 
and more likely under Bertrand competition if products are substitutes. Moreover, as 
products become closer substitutes, a takeover becomes more likely under Bertrand and 
less likely under Cournot competition. 
 
Keywords: Merger, Takeover Bidding, Oligopoly 
JEL Classification: D43, D44, L10, L41 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Übernahmeanreize im Oligopol 
In dieser Arbeit wird ein Modell zur Analyse von Fusionsanreizen vorgestellt, in dem – 
im Gegensatz zu vorhergehenden Untersuchungen – sowohl die Gewinnzuwächse der 
an der Fusion beteiligten Firmen als auch die Gewinnveränderungen der 
Konkurrenzunternehmen die Übernahmewahrscheinlichkeit bestimmen. Die wichtigste 
Anwendung ist der Vergleich der Übernahmeanreize im Cournot- und Bertrand-
Oligopol mit differenzierten Gütern und linearen Nachfrage- und Kostenfunktionen. Die 
Arbeit bietet eine vollständige Analyse für eine beliebige Anzahl von Unternehmen, 
komplementäre und substituierbare Güter und unterschiedliche Grade der 
Produktdifferenzierung. Eine Zunahme der Konzentration in einer Industrie ist 
wahrscheinlicher bei Cournot-Konkurrenz, wenn die Güter komplementär sind, und 
wahrscheinlicher bei Bertrand-Konkurrenz, wenn die Güter substituierbar sind. Des 
weiteren steigt (sinkt) die Übernahmewahrscheinlichkeit mit zunehmender 
Substituierbarkeit der Güter bei Bertrand- (Cournot-) Konkurrenz. 
                                                 
*  We would like to thank Paul Heidhues, Todd R. Kaplan, Benny Moldovanu, Rainer Nitsche, 
Norbert Schulz, Johan Stennek, Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, and seminar participants at the 10th WZB 
Conference on Industrial Organization (Berlin), Humboldt University at Berlin and the 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for their comments. 
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1 Introduction
Traditional analysis of takeover or merger incentives in oligopolistic industries focuses
on conditions of stability. Essentially, this analysis asks whether insiders would be
better oﬀ by staying independent instead of merging their businesses. This criterion is
most explicit in axiomatic approaches on endogenous cartel formation (see, e.g., Selten
(1973)) and ownership structures (see, e.g., Horn and Persson (2001)), and it is used in
the seminal work of Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) and Davidson and Deneckere
(1985) on exogenously proposed mergers. But it also drives the analysis of pure strategy
equilibria in the simultaneous auction model of Kamien and Zang (1990).
One implication of the standard approach is that the outsiders share of total industry
gains that arise from concentration plays no role for predicting merger incentives. Besides
neglecting potentially relevant information, which may prove useful for empirical studies,
the stability approach yields rather extreme predictions. Most notably, Salant, Switzer,
and Reynolds (1983) Þnd that in the linear Cournot model with homogeneous products
only a bilateral merger to monopoly is stable, while Davidson and Deneckere (1985) show
for the linear Bertrand model with diﬀerentiated products that any bilateral merger is
stable.1 At the same time, however, outsiders gain more than insiders in both models.
To our knowledge, the resulting free-rider problem due to the public good character
of increasing industry concentration has not yet been fully incorporated in theoretical
approaches dealing with merger incentives.
1More recent literature has challenged these results by considering, e.g., cost savings (e.g., Perry and
Porter (1985)), behavioral asymmetries (e.g., Levin (1990)), or more general demand conditions (e.g.,
Cheung (1992)).
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Casual observations suggest that the public good nature of increased concentration
and its implications for takeover strategies are important. For example, Stigler (1950)
points out that the major diﬃculty in forming a merger is that it is more proÞtable
to be outside a merger than to be a participant. A recent example is provided by
the depressed semiconductor industry, where rumors of (further) consolidation among
chipmakers tend to boost share prices of all market participants.2 Illustrative are also
reactions to the recent announcement of Japans Nippon Steel that it intends to tie-up
its business with those of Sumitomo Metal Industries and Kobe Steel. Together with
hopes of further mergers in the US this considerably boosted share prices for European
steel makers. Interestingly, the head of the newly formed European steel maker Arcelor
called for further mergers within the steel industry when commenting on the intentions
to consolidate the Japanese steel industry.3,4
To capture the free-rider problem and thereby incorporate both insiders and out-
siders proÞts into the takeover prediction, we propose to model the takeover process
as an auction in which a designated target optimally sets its reserve price. Under rela-
tively standard symmetry restrictions on Þrms characteristics, we obtain a simple and
intuitive prediction for the probability of takeover. This probability is only a function of
the number of market participants and of the insiders share of total industry gains due
to the increase in concentration. Typically, the takeover probability is less than one as,
2Financial Times UK, 4th December, 2001.
3Financial Times Europe, 13th December, 2001.
4A number of studies has reported abnormal stock returns for competitors, e.g., Eckbo (1985).
However, the source of these positive rival returns is still disputed (see, e.g., Song and Walking (2000)
for a recent account of the literature).
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given the targets optimal reserve price, being an outsider will be more proÞtable than
becoming an insider. Our major application is to provide a complete characterization of
takeover incentives in the N -Þrm linear Cournot and Bertrand case.
More precisely, our analysis proceeds in two steps. Section 2 solves the takeover model
and discusses the implied predictions. Amongst other things, our bidding game reveals
an hitherto unexplored diﬀerence between Þxed and marginal cost synergies. In contrast
to marginal cost synergies, Þxed cost synergies of any size never imply that a takeover
will be successful with probability one. Consequently, from a welfare perspective it is
likely that there are too few takeovers with Þxed cost synergies.
Section 3 applies the takeover model to the study of the N -Þrm linear Bertrand and
Cournot case. We Þnd that an increase in concentration is more likely under Bertrand
competition if goods are substitutes and more likely under Cournot competition if goods
are complements. Moreover, we show that the probability of takeover is decreasing in
the degree of substitutability between products under Cournot competition and increas-
ing under Bertrand competition. Our analysis for the linear case therefore provides a
complete picture how the mode of competition, the character of goods, and the diﬀer-
entiation of products aﬀect market concentration. Despite the prominence of the linear
model in the theoretical literature on industrial organization, such an analysis has, to
our knowledge, not been undertaken so far.
Incidentally, in the course of our analysis, we also obtain a complete characterization
of the stability condition with diﬀerentiated substitutes and complements in the linear
model, which, to our knowledge, has also not been provided so far.
Finally, by linking the mode of competition and the likelihood of takeover we can
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complement previous work on the welfare comparison of Bertrand and Cournot competi-
tion. This line of research was initiated by Singh and Vives (1984) and Vives (1985) (see
also more recently Dastidar (1997), Qiu (1997), and Häckner (2000)). We argue that a
comparison of total welfare must take into account the possibility of further concentra-
tion, which may counteract gains in consumer surplus arising from a more competitive
mode of strategic interaction.
We are only aware of two recent papers by Molnar (2000) and Fridolfsson and Sten-
nek (2000) that also consider how insiders fare relatively to outsiders. However, both
papers focus on unproÞtable preemptive mergers and neither of them considers reserve
price maximization nor makes the subsequent market interaction in form of Cournot or
Bertrand competition explicit. As Þrms interact in the market, our model of takeover
represents an auction with externalities. From this strand of the literature Jehiel and
Moldovanu (2000a,b) are most closely related as they also consider downstream interac-
tion among bidders. In contrast to our paper, these papers focus on the interdependency
between allocative and informational externalities and on the optimal design of licence
auctions, respectively.
2 The General Model
2.1 The Bidding Game
Consider an industry with N > 2 Þrms, indexed by i ∈ I = {1, ...,N}, which produce
symmetrically diﬀerentiated products and face the same cost conditions. If the N inde-
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pendent Þrms compete in the market, they realize the same proÞt denoted by ΠN > 0.
Let Þrm i = 1 be the target Þrm, which is exogenously picked.5 We assume that the
target Þrm remains active in the market if there is no takeover, implying, for instance,
that a Þnancial investor or a Þrm operating in a diﬀerent market would step in if intra-
industry takeover fails. Suppose the takeover is successful. This reduces the number of
independent Þrms to N − 1. If N − 1 Þrms compete in the market, the integrated Þrm,
which controls multiple products, i.e., that of the target and the acquirer, realizes the
proÞt ΠN−1M . The N − 2 symmetric outsiders, which control a unitary product, realize
ΠN−1U . Denote πM = Π
N−1
M − 2ΠN and πU = ΠN−1U − ΠN . Total industry gains from an
increase in concentration are then given by π∗ = πM + (N − 2)πU . In the light of the
following applications, we can restrict consideration to cases where, following takeover,
total industry proÞts strictly increase.6
Assumption 1. Industry proÞts strictly increase after takeover: π∗ > 0.
Note that this assumption implies, in particular, that either πU > 0 or πM > 0 must
5This can be explained, e.g., by generational handoﬀs of family-owned Þrms or unforeseen adverse
shocks. For instance, the takeover of Camron Iron Works by Cooper Industries in 1989 provides a
well-documented example (see Kaplan, Mitchell, Wruck (1997)), in which a publicly traded company
became a likely acquisition target after the family, which largely controlled the company, expressed its
intention to sell. For broader empirical evidence on the characteristics of targets see Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1988).
6This condition rules out the case where πM < 0 and πU < 0 holds, for which we Þnd multiple
symmetric (bidding) equilibria. In these cases there is, however, always an equilibrium where no takeover
takes place. If we select this equilibrium, which maximizes industry proÞts, Proposition 1 also extends
to these cases.
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hold strictly.
We now specify the takeover game as an auction in which the target can commit
to a reserve price. This formulation incorporates two distinctive features of real-world
takeovers for corporate control. Predominant takeover regulation in the United States
encourages the board of directors to structure the sale of the Þrms assets as an auction,
while it is generally believed that the Þrms board has considerable power in extracting
rents from bidders. For instance, Cramton (1998) compares the various tactics employed
by the target Þrm (most importantly the use of poison pills) to setting an (implicit)
reserve price.7 While our proposed takeover game incorporates these features, our focus
on the issue of a free-rider problem among competing Þrms leads us to abstract from the
role of informational incompleteness or institutional details such as toeholds, minority
shareholders, or participation costs.8
The takeover process involves two stages. In the Þrst stage, the target commits to
sell to the highest bidder if the respective price does not fall short of a reserve price B,
which is chosen by the target. (We comment below on the outcome if the target can
not commit.) In the second stage, buyers simultaneously submit bids. When analyzing
the takeover game, we restrict attention to subgame perfect equilibria where bidders
choose symmetric strategies and where ties are broken randomly. (We comment below
on the justiÞcation of this requirement.) An outcome of the takeover game consists thus
7Comment and Schwert (1995) provide empirical evidence showing that such measures increase the
expected takeover premium.
8The public good problem on which we focus is diﬀerent from that analyzed in the Þnance literature,
where the refusal of individual shareholders to tender their shares may frustrate a value enhancing
takeover (see Grossman and Hart (1980)).
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of a reserve price set by the target, the posted bids, and the selected acquirer (if any).
Under the symmetry restriction we Þnd a unique equilibrium. In what follows we are
only interested in the industrys takeover probability, which we denote by ρ. We thus
restrict the description of the equilibrium to ρ.
Proposition 1. The takeover game has a unique equilibrium outcome where bidders
use symmetric strategies. The takeover probability ρ is given as follows:
(i) If πM ≤ 0 then ρ = 0.
(ii) If πU ≤ 0 then ρ = 1.
(iii) If πM > 0 and πU > 0 then
ρ = 1−
³
1− πM
π∗
´N−1
. (1)
Proof. By Assumption 1, we only have to consider the following cases (i)-(iii) stated in
the proposition. Assertion (i) is immediate because the merger is unproÞtable. We can
thus restrict consideration to the cases (ii) and (iii) where πM > 0. Suppose that the
target sets B such that
ΠN−1M −ΠN−1U ≤ B ≤ ΠN−1M − ΠN , (2)
implying by optimality that any serious bid will just match the reserve price B. As we
restrict consideration to symmetric bidding strategies, denote by r the probability with
which each Þrm i > 1 bids seriously. Given (2) this probability will be determined by an
indiﬀerence requirement. To determine this indiﬀerence condition between posting the
bid B and abstaining from putting in a serious bid, it proves to be more convenient to
take a slightly diﬀerent approach. If a Þrm is indiﬀerent between these two strategies,
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it is as well indiﬀerent between abstaining from bidding and bidding seriously with
probability r. In the Þrst case the probability of takeover is just 1 − (1 − r)N−2. The
Þrms expected payoﬀ from this strategy is then equal to
£
1− (1− r)N−2¤ΠN−1U + (1− r)N−2ΠN . (3)
If the Þrm decides to bid with probability r, its expected payoﬀ is determined as fol-
lows. From an ex-ante perspective, i.e., before the Þrm has rolled the dice to determine
whether to bid seriously or not, takeover takes now place with probability 1−(1−r)N−1.
Moreover, the Þrm expects to buy the target with probability [1− (1− r)N−1]/[N − 1].9
Hence, the expected payoﬀ from mixing with probability r is equal to
[1− (1− r)N−1]
·
1
N − 1
¡
ΠN−1M −B
¢
+
N − 2
N − 1Π
N−1
U
¸
+ (1− r)N−1ΠN . (4)
Requiring now that (3) equals (4), we obtain the condition
B = ΠN−1M − ΠN−1U + (ΠN−1U − ΠN)(N − 1)
r(1− r)N−2
1− (1− r)N−1 . (5)
Condition (5) determines for each B satisfying (2) a unique equilibrium bidding prob-
ability and vice versa. Substituting into the targets payoﬀ, which we denote by Ω, we
obtain
Ω = (1− r)N−1ΠN + (ΠN−1U − ΠN)(N − 1)r(1− r)N−2
+
£
1− (1− r)N−1¤ (ΠN−1M − ΠN−1U ).
9This expression is simply determined by the requirement that the sum of all Þrms individual
takeover probabilities must sum up to 1−(1−r)N−1. (Note that Þrms follow symmetric and uncorrelated
strategies.)
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Diﬀerentiating with respect to r yields
Ω0(r) = (1− r)N−3(N − 1) [πM − rπ∗] . (6)
By (6) Ω is strictly quasiconcave over 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. We are now in the position to prove
the assertion for the cases (ii) and (iii). Consider Þrst case (iii), where πM > 0 and
πU > 0, implying by (6) that Ω has a unique interior optimum at
r =
πM
π∗
. (7)
Substituting (7) into the probability of takeover yields (1). It remains to show that
(2) must be satisÞed. As B > ΠN−1M − ΠN implies r = 0 and as r = 1 holds for all
B < ΠN−1M −ΠN−1U , these choices of B are not optimal for the target.
Turn next to case (ii), where πU ≤ 0. This implies by (6) that Ω is strictly increasing
in r and obtains its maximum at the corner r = 1, so that ρ = 1. We can again exclude
all choices B > ΠN−1M − ΠN and B < ΠN−1M −ΠN−1U . Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 states that the takeover probability is only a function of the number
of Þrms and the share of total industry gains that is appropriated by the insiders. The
takeover probability is equal to zero if only outsiders gain from concentration. It is equal
to one only if outsiders will not gain at all. As demonstrated below, this is typically only
the case if insiders enjoy synergies by which their marginal costs are reduced. Consider
next the intermediate case, in which both insiders and outsiders gain. Regardless of the
relative size of πU and πM , we Þnd that the target sets the reserve price suﬃciently high
such that 0 < πM −B < πU . While all Þrms beneÞt from a takeover, given this choice
of the reserve price any bidder would prefer to stay an outsider rather than to win the
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auction. In equilibrium each bidder randomizes over bidding the posted reserve price
B or abstaining, e.g., by putting in an unacceptable oﬀer. By (7) the probability with
which each Þrm bids seriously is equal to the insiders share of proÞts.
In what follows, we investigate how various factors inßuence the probability of
takeover. By (1) this only amounts to analyzing how the insiders share of total gains
πM/π
∗ change. In particular, we will consider the role of Þxed and marginal cost savings
in this section, while Section 3 considers the choice of Bertrand or Cournot competition,
the substitutability or complementarity of goods, and the role of product diﬀerentiation
in a linear model.
Before proceeding with the analysis, we comment on some aspects of our bidding
game. Consider Þrst the restriction to symmetric bidding equilibria. In the most in-
teresting case when both insiders and outsiders beneÞt from concentration the bidding
game has always multiple asymmetric equilibria where some Þrm(s) are made the pri-
mary acquirer(s) and the remaining Þrms abstain from bidding. In particular, there
always exists an equilibrium where some Þrm i ≥ 2 takes over the target and pays
the price ΠN−1M − ΠN . By selecting this equilibrium we obtain the extreme prediction
that a takeover occurs with probability one and leaves the acquirer with zero gains. In
particular, the proÞt diﬀerential πU does not aﬀect the outcome. Furthermore, coordi-
nation on asymmetric equilibria may be impossible if there are no explicit coordination
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mechanisms or if players can neither negotiate eﬃciently nor write binding contracts.10,11
It may be questioned whether the target can fully commit to a reserve price. In
the absence of a reserve price exceeding ΠN , it generally holds in case (iii) that the
probability of takeover is strictly higher than that in (1). In particular, the probability
is always equal to one if the gains of insiders do not fall short of those of outsiders. As
noted above, the optimal choice of the reserve price by the target creates a public good
problem amongst bidders even if insiders gain more than outsiders, while otherwise the
already existing public good problem becomes more aggravated.12,13
Finally, as argued in the introduction, we feel that the route taken in this paper has
the advantage of incorporating more information into the prediction of takeovers and
therefore of the prevailing industry concentration. It may now be argued that as long as
10Similar symmetry restrictions are often invoked in the literature on war of attrition games (see for an
overview Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). It might be argued that the target can break the coordination
problem by determining a preferred bidder. However, unless we introduce a diﬀerent game, this
communication does not alter the equilibrium set.
11Harsanyis (1973) puriÞcation theorem provides a rationale for interpreting the symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium we select. From this perspective, we may interpret the mixed-strategy equilibrium
of the complete-information bidding game as the limit of pure-strategy equilibria of slightly perturbed
games of incomplete information where, for example, buyers have private information about their (sta-
tistically independent) payoﬀs in case of takeover.
12Formally, by substituting B = ΠN , the individual bidding probabilities r are obtained implicitly by
equation (5) in case πM < πU holds.
13The target may likewise lack the commitment not to sell in the future if the current bids fall short
of its reserve price. If this is the case, an extension of our model would allow for repeated auctions,
taking place with some delay. Delay may be costly as players discount future payoﬀs and as they obtain
in the meantime the N -Þrm oligopoly proÞts (per period of time).
11
a takeover beneÞts insiders these gains should be realized, at least in the long run. In
this respect our results present a short-run prediction of takeover activity. If the market
is, however, constantly re-shaped by exogenous forces, prompting entry and exit, the
public good eﬀect underlying Proposition 1 may well have permanent implications for
the prevailing degree of concentration.
2.2 Cost Synergies
While still conÞning ourselves to a reduced form for Þrms proÞts, we can use Proposition
1 to investigate how cost synergies aﬀect the takeover probabilities. This reveals a
fundamental diﬀerence between Þxed and marginal cost reductions.
Suppose Þrst that the takeover decreases insiders Þxed costs, e.g., by reducing over-
head expenditures. To express this in a parsimonious way, assume that integrating their
business allows insiders to reap some windfall gain of f ≥ 0. In a slight abuse of notation
the proÞt diﬀerential of insiders is thus equal to πM + f . As Þrms strategies on the
output market are not aﬀected, the proÞt diﬀerential of outsiders remains unaﬀected.
Under standard conditions, which, for instance, prevail in the linear case analyzed in the
following section, outsiders are always positively aﬀected by a higher concentration as
long as the integrating Þrms do not enjoy a reduction in marginal costs. Given πU > 0,
we know from (1) that regardless of the size of f the takeover probability will always
stay below one. As f becomes high, it is, however, very likely that the takeover in-
creases welfare, even after taking into account a possible reduction in consumer rents.
Hence, if Þxed cost synergies are suﬃciently high, it is likely that takeover occurs with
12
an ineﬃciently low probability.
In sharp contrast, if the integrated Þrm can reduce its marginal costs, this should
aﬀect outsiders negatively. Moreover, if this eﬀect is suﬃciently pronounced, outsiders
may become strictly worse oﬀ compared to the status-quo. But given πU ≤ 0 we know
from (1) that the takeover must occur with probability one.
3 Takeover Incentives under Bertrand and Cournot
Competition
Suppose that a representative consumers utility from consuming the quantity qi of Þrm
i0s product and paying the price pi is given by
α
NX
i=1
qi − 1
2
Ã
NX
i=1
q2i + 2γ
NX
i=1,i6=j
qiqj
!
−
NX
i=1
qipi.
This quadratic utility function has been widely used in oligopoly theory to compare
Cournot and Bertrand competition (see, e.g., Singh and Vives (1984), Bester and Pe-
trakis (1993), Qiu (1997), Häckner (2000)). Products are substitutes (complements) if
γ is positive (negative). To ensure that the Þrms problem stays strictly concave we
have to assume γ > 1/(1−N). Moreover, Assumption 1 excludes the case γ = 0 where
goods are fully independent and a takeover has no implications.14 From the Þrst-order
condition determining the optimal consumption of good i, we obtain the inverse demand
14With Bertrand competition Assumption 1 also rules out the case γ = 1 where industry proÞts are
zero before and after the takeover.
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for product i:
pi = α− qi − γ
X
j 6=i
qj, for i, j ∈ I, i 6= j. (8)
On the supply side we assume that Þrms can produce at constant marginal costs equal
to c, with α > c ≥ 0.
3.1 Cournot Competition
Suppose Þrst that Þrms compete in quantities. We relegate all derivations to the Ap-
pendix. If N independent Þrms compete, each realizes the payoﬀ ΠN,C, which is given
by
ΠN,C =
µ
α− c
γ(N − 1) + 2
¶2
. (9)
If takeover takes places, which reduces the number of independent Þrms to N − 1, the
proÞts of the integrated Þrm ΠN−1,CM and the proÞts of each outsider Π
N−1,C
U are given
by
ΠN−1,CM =
1 + γ
2
µ
(α− c)(2− γ)
2 + γ(N − 1)− γ2
¶2
, (10)
ΠN−1,CU =
µ
α− c
2 + γ(N − 1)− γ2
¶2
. (11)
Using (10) and (11) we can calculate the respective proÞt diﬀerentials πN−1,CM and π
N−1,C
U .
It is straightforward that πN−1,CU > 0 holds for all γ, where we use γ 6= 0, i.e., outsiders
always gain from a higher concentration of the industry. On the other side, it is well-
known that in the case of substitutes πN−1,CM < 0 may hold, i.e., that the insiders proÞts
decrease.
14
With linear demand quantities are strategic substitutes in the sense of Bulow, Geanako-
plos, and Klemperer (1985) if goods are substitutes. In other words, outsiders will opti-
mally increase their supply in reaction to the expected reduction of the integrated Þrms
total output. This reduces the insiders ability to reap the beneÞts from a higher concen-
tration. This accommodation eﬀect is relatively more pronounced the less diﬀerentiated
the goods are, i.e., the higher γ > 0, and the smaller the integrated Þrms share of total
output, i.e., the higher the number of Þrms N . While insiders strictly lose if goods are
complete substitutes, i.e., if γ = 1 holds, we Þnd a threshold γC > 0 such that also
insiders gain if γ < γC holds. The range of parameters γ > 0 for which insiders gain
shrinks as the market share of each individual Þrm becomes smaller with an increase in
N .
If goods are complements, the Þrms strategies become strategic complements in the
case of Cournot competition with linear demand. As the integrated Þrm increases its
output to internalize the positive externality on the demand of its own goods, the outside
Þrms follow suit, creating a positive feedback eﬀect for the insiders.
These observations are formalized in the following result.
Lemma 1. In the case of Cournot competition the takeover implies the following
changes in proÞts. Outsiders always gain, i.e., πCU > 0, while there exists a threshold
0 < γC < 1 such that insiders gain if and only if γ < γC, i.e., πCM > 0 if γ < γ
C ,
πCM < 0 if γ > γ
C, and πCM = 0 if γ = γ
C. Moreover, γC is strictly decreasing in N .
Proof. See Appendix.
To provide an example for the threshold γC, we obtain γC ≈ 0.56 if there are N = 3
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Þrms in the market. Lemma 1 is of independent interest as it complements previous
results on the proÞtability of a merger under Cournot competition with linear demand.
To our knowledge, the literature has conÞned itself to noting that a bilateral merger,
which does not lead to monopoly, can not be proÞtable if goods are complete substitutes.
By Lemma 1 proÞtability can be achieved if goods are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. If we
were to take a more standard approach asking whether a bilateral merger is stable, we
could therefore conclude from Lemma 1 that this is the case if and only if γ ≤ γC holds.
Our takeover game, which takes into account also outsiders proÞts, obtains less radical
predictions. Substituting equilibrium proÞts into the takeover formula (1), we obtain
the following result.
Proposition 2. In the case of Cournot competition, the takeover probability ρC is
strictly decreasing over γ ≤ γC and satisÞes ρC = 0 for all γ ≥ γC. Moreover, ρC < 1
holds everywhere.
Proof. See Appendix.
As products become less complementary (over γ < 0) and more substitutable (over
γ > 0), the takeover probability ρC decreases. Moreover, the takeover probability is
always strictly smaller than one. This holds even though for values γ < γC the proÞts
of the integrated Þrm exceed those realized if the takeover fails. It is worthwhile to
recall that the underlying public good problem in the takeover process stems from
two diﬀerent sources. First, it can be shown that πN−1,CU > π
N−1,C
M , i.e., that outsiders
proÞts increase more than those of insiders. Second, we can show that B > ΠN,C, i.e.,
that the target requires a bid premium.
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3.2 Bertrand Competition
Consider next the case of Bertrand competition in prices. We obtain from (8) the
individual demand functions
qi = max
½
(α− pi)(γ(N − 2) + 1)− γ(N − 1)α+ γ
P
j 6=i pj
(1− γ)(γ(N − 1) + 1) , 0
¾
. (12)
Solving for the unique equilibrium with N independent Þrms we obtain the individual
proÞts
ΠN,B =
(1− γ)(γ(N − 2) + 1)
(γ(N − 1) + 1)
µ
α− c
γ(N − 3) + 2
¶2
, (13)
while after a takeover insiders and outsiders realize the respective proÞts
ΠN−1,BM =
[(γ(N − 3) + 1)(1− γ)(γ(2N − 3) + 2)(α− c)]2
2(γ(N − 3) + 1) [(1− γ)(γ(N − 1) + 1)]Ψ2 , (14)
ΠN−1,BU =
[(γ(N − 2) + 1)(1− γ)(γ(N − 2) + 1)(α− c)]2
(γ(N − 2) + 1) [(1− γ)(γ(N − 1) + 1)]Ψ2 , (15)
with Ψ = γ2(N2 − 5N + 5) + γ(3N − 7) + 2.
With linear demand the case of Bertrand competition mirrors that of Cournot com-
petition. If goods are substitutes prices are strategic complements, while if goods are
complements prices are strategic substitutes. Hence, in contrast to the Cournot case,
both insiders and outsiders cannot be worse oﬀ after a takeover if goods are substitutes.
However, insiders may lose if goods are suﬃciently complementary.
Lemma 2. In the case of Bertrand competition the takeover implies the following
changes in proÞts. Outsiders always gain, i.e., πBU > 0, while there exists a threshold
γB < 0 such that insiders only gain if and only if γ > γB, i.e., πBM > 0 if γ > γ
B,
πBM < 0 if γ < γ
B, and πBM = 0 if γ = γ
B. Moreover, γB is strictly increasing in N .
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Proof. See Appendix.
To provide an example, we obtain γB ≈ −0.36 for N = 3. Lemma 2 again comple-
ments results in the literature on Bertrand competition, where, to our knowledge, only
the case of integration under substitutes has received attention so far.
Substituting equilibrium proÞts (14) and (15) into the takeover formula (1), we obtain
the following result.
Proposition 3. In the case of Bertrand competition, the takeover probability ρC is
strictly increasing over γ ≥ γB and satisÞes ρB(γC) = 0 for all γ ≤ γB. Moreover,
ρB < 1 holds everywhere.
Proof. See Appendix.
By Proposition 3 the takeover probability ρB increases as products become less com-
plementary (over γ < 0) and more substitutable (over γ > 0).
3.3 Comparison of Cournot and Bertrand Competition
Comparing Propositions 2 and 3 reveals that the case of Bertrand competition mirrors
that of Cournot competition. In other words, while the insiders share of total gains
decreases in γ under Cournot competition, it increases under Bertrand competition.
Intuitively, the respective takeover probabilities ρC and ρB cross at γ = 0.15 Together
with Propositions 2 and 3 this implies the following comparison.
15Using LHôpitals rule, we obtain for limγ→0 ρB(γ) and limγ→0 ρC(γ) the value 1−
³
2(N−2)
2N−3
´N−1
.
It should be recalled that the case of γ = 0 is excluded by Assumption 1, which, however, is without
consequences for this argument.
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Proposition 4. If goods are substitutes, i.e., if γ > 0, the takeover probability is
strictly higher under Bertrand than under Cournot competition, i.e., ρB > ρC. The
converse holds if goods are complements, i.e., if γ < 0.
Proposition 4 formalizes an often expressed view on the interaction of market struc-
ture and conduct, whereby an increase in concentration is more likely under Bertrand
competition if goods are substitutes and more likely under Cournot competition if goods
are complements.
Figure 1 illustrates our results by showing the takeover probabilities under Cournot
and Bertrand as a function of γ ∈ (−0.5, 1) for the triopoly case. As already mentioned
above, for N = 3 takeover is proÞtable for insiders under Bertrand if γ ≥ γB ≈ −0.36
and under Cournot if γ ≤ γC ≈ 0.56.
(Figure 1 about here!)
Besides appealing to the role of capacity constraints (a view famously formalized by
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)), one often thinks of Cournot and Bertrand competition
as diﬀerent forms of market conduct; i.e., as diﬀerent degrees of toughness of competition
in the Þnal market.16 From this perspective Bertrand can be considered as the more
competitive mode of market interaction because the resulting equilibrium prices are
strictly lower than under Cournot competition. Proposition 4 can then be summarized
as saying that more competition makes higher concentration more likely if goods are
substitutes and less likely if goods are complements.
16One well-known formalization of this view can be obtained by a conjectural variation approach.
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The last observation rises an interesting issue regarding the welfare comparison of
Bertrand and Cournot competition. By reducing the prevailing prices for a given number
of Þrms, Bertrand competition increases consumer rents and total welfare.17 If goods
are substitutes, we know, however, from Proposition 4 that this beneÞt of Bertrand
competition is mitigated by the higher propensity for takeover under this mode of com-
petition. From this perspective an adequate comparison of welfare under diﬀerent modes
of conduct must take into account the implications on the prevailing concentration of the
industry, which is itself an endogenous variable. If a more competitive mode of conduct
makes higher concentration more likely, this should typically produce a countervailing
eﬀect on total welfare, which may more than outweigh lower prices for a given number
of Þrms.
If goods are complements, a similar countervailing eﬀect prevails as in the case with
substitutes. By Proposition 4 takeover is now less likely under Bertrand competition. As
welfare increases with concentration if goods are complements, this counteracts the gains
from lower prices under Bertrand competition obtained for a given number of Þrms.
4 Conclusion
This paper introduces a framework to study takeover incentives, which, in contrast to
most previous approaches, takes into account both insiders and outsiders gains from
a higher concentration. We obtain a simple and intuitive prediction for the likelihood
17This holds for the linear speciÞcations in Section 3. For more general results on prices and welfare
see, e.g., Singh and Vives (1984), Vives (1985), and Okuguchi (1987).
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of takeover, which is an increasing function of the insiders share in total industry gains
achieved by an increase in concentration.
Our main application to a linear model provides a complete characterization of
takeover probabilities under Bertrand and Cournot competition, i.e., for an arbitrary
number of Þrms, for complements and substitutes, and for diﬀerentiated and homoge-
nous goods. Under Cournot competition the insiders share of total industry gains
strictly decreases as goods become less complementary and more substitutable. The
opposite holds under Bertrand competition. Our model predicts a higher probability
for takeover under Bertrand competition if goods are substitutes and a lower probabil-
ity if goods are complements. We argue that this counteracts any welfare gains under
Bertrand competition due to lower prices for a given number of Þrms.
To conclude this paper, we return to the casual observations on the steel and semi-
conductor industry made in the introduction. Both industries are characterized by
extreme cyclical movements in capacity utilization, prices, and proÞts. It may be an
interesting empirical question whether consolidating activities in these and other indus-
tries are hampered by the addressed public good eﬀect. Our prediction linking takeover
and consolidation to the insiders share of total gains may provide a useful tool in this
analysis.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Derivation of proÞts
We Þrst solve the Cournot equilibrium in more detail. Without a takeover the N
independent Þrms set quantities to maximize Πi = (α− c−qi−γ
P
j 6=i qj)qi, which gives
is reaction function
qi = max
½
α− c− γPj 6=i qj
2
, 0
¾
.
Solving the system of N best-response functions, we obtain a unique equilibrium where
the symmetric quantities are given by
qN,C =
α− c
γ(N − 1) + 2 .
Substituting in Πi we obtain (9). If the target is taken over by, say, Þrm j ∈ I\{1}, the
integrated Þrms proÞt equals
ΠM = (α− c− q1 − γqj − γ
X
k∈I\{1,j}
qk)q1 + (α− c− qj − γq1 − γ
X
k∈I\{1,j}
qk)qj,
Solving for the reaction function, we obtain that the two quantities are set equal to
qM = max
(
α− c− γPk∈I\{1,j} qk
2(1 + γ)
, 0
)
.
For outsiders k ∈ I\{1, j}, we obtain the reaction function
qU = max
½
α− c− γPi6=k qi
2
, 0
¾
.
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Solving for the unique equilibrium we obtain for the integrated Þrm and the outsiders
the quantities
qN−1,CM =
(α− c)(2− γ)
2(2 + γ(N − 1)− γ2) ,
qN−1,CU =
α− c
2 + γ(N − 1)− γ2 ,
which yield the proÞts (10) and (11).
Proof of the assertions
We are now in the position to prove Lemma 1. For the proÞt diﬀerential of outsiders,
which is denoted by πCU in the Cournot case, it is immediate that π
C
U > 0 holds from
γ ∈ (1/(1−N), 1].18 Calculating the equilibrium proÞt diﬀerential of the combined Þrm,
we obtain that πCM > 0 holds if and only if
N2γ2(3− γ) +N(4γ − 10γ2 + 2γ3) + 11γ2 − γ3 − 8γ − 4 < 0. (16)
Condition (16) is quadratic in N , which suggests an indirect way to prove the assertion
in Lemma 1. Solving the quadratic form we obtain two critical values
N1 = 1 + 2
Ãp
4− γ2(3− γ)− (1− γ)
γ(3− γ)
!
, (17)
N2 = 1− 2
Ãp
4− γ2(3− γ) + (1− γ)
γ(3− γ)
!
,
such that (16) holds for γ < 0 if N1 ≤ N ≤ N2 and for γ > 0 if N2 ≤ N ≤ N1. We Þrst
show that the term in rectangular brackets in (17) is monotonic in γ. Calculating its
derivative reveals that, regardless of the sign of γ, the sign of the derivative is determined
18For ease of exposition we neglect at this point and later on the fact that we excluded the case of
independent demand where γ = 0.
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by the expression −γ3+γ2+2γ−12−2p(γ + 1)(γ2−2γ+3), which is strictly negative
given γ ∈ [−1, 1]. By substituting γ = −1 it follows that N1 ≤ 2 and N2 ≤ 2. We
show next that the only binding condition is N ≤ N1 for the case γ > 0. Consider Þrst
the case γ < 0 and the condition N ≤ N2. Transforming the requirement and using
γ(N − 1) > −1, which holds by assumption, shows that it is surely satisÞed in case
4γ2 < 5+γ, which always holds. Note next that for γ < 0 the condition N1 ≤ N follows
directly as N ≥ 3 and N1 ≤ 2. Turning to γ > 0 note similarly that N ≥ N2 holds from
N2 ≤ 2. It thus remains to consider the condition N ≤ N1, where we already know that
the threshold N1 is strictly decreasing in γ. Moreover, for γ → 0 it holds that N1 →∞,
while N1 = 1 +
√
2 < 3 holds for γ = 1. Combining the values for N1 at the boundaries
with the monotonicity of N1 in γ proves the existence of the threshold 0 < γC < 1 and
its monotonicity in N , as asserted in Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Denote the equilibrium probability with which a given Þrm bids the reserve price in
the Cournot case by rC(γ, N). Note that, in contrast to the proof of Proposition 1, we
now make the dependency on both γ and N explicit. By Proposition 1 and Lemma
1 we obtain rC(γ, N) > 0 for all γ < γC(N) and rC(γ, N) = 0 for all γ ≥ γC(N),
where we have written the threshold γC(N) explicitly as a function of N . Recall from
Lemma 1 that 0 < γC(N) < 1 and that γC(N) is strictly decreasing in N . We show
that for all N the probability rC(γ,N), and thus ρC(γ,N), is strictly decreasing over
γ ∈ (1/(1−N), γC(N)]. Substituting the respective proÞt diﬀerentials πCM and πCU into
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(7) and diﬀerentiating yields
drC
dγ
=
−2 (N − 2) [γ(N − 1) + 2] ξ1(γ, N)
[γ3(N − 1)2 − γ2(3N2 − 8N + 7) + 4γ(N2 − 4N + 4) + 4(2N − 3)]2 ,
with
ξ1(γ, N) = γ
3(N − 1)− 2γ2(2N2 − 4N + 3) + 6γ(N2 − 4N + 5) + 4(3N − 5).
As γ(N − 1) + 2 > 0 follows from γ > 1/(1 − N), drC/dγ < 0 holds if ξ1(γ,N) is
strictly positive over γ ∈ (1/(1 − N), γC(N)]. To show that this holds, we prove Þrst
that ξ1(γ, N) is strictly increasing in N over N ≥ 3. We denote the derivative of ξ1 with
respect to N by ξ2(γ, N) and obtain
ξ2(γ, N) = γ
3 − 8γ2N + 8γ2 + 12γN − 24γ + 12. (18)
Claim. It holds that ξ2(γ, N) > 0.
Proof. Suppose Þrst γ > 0, in which case ξ2 > 0 holds if
N >
−γ3 − 8γ2 + 24γ − 12
4γ (3− 2γ) . (19)
It is thus suﬃcient to show that the right-hand side of (19) is bounded from above by
three. Setting the right-hand side of (19) lower than three reduces to −γ3 + 16γ2 −
12γ − 12 < 0. We show that the left-hand side of this inequality, which we denote by
ξ3(γ), is strictly negative over the considered support γ ∈ (0, 1). Diﬀerentiating ξ3 yields
ξ03(γ) = −3γ2−32γ+12, which is negative over γ ∈ (0, (16−2
√
55)/3) and positive over
γ ∈ ((16 − 2√55)/3, 1], implying that ξ3(γ) < 0 is surely satisÞed in case it holds on
the boundaries of the considered interval. (Observe that (16− 2√55)/3 ≈ 0.39.) As we
obtain ξ3(0) = −3 and ξ3(1) = −9/4, we have thus shown that ξ2 > 0 holds for γ > 0.
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Suppose next that γ < 0, where ξ2 > 0 holds if
N <
−γ3 − 8γ2 + 24γ − 12
4γ (3− 2γ) . (20)
It is thus suﬃcient to show that the right-hand side of (20) is bounded from below by
three, which is again the case if ξ3(γ) is strictly negative over the considered support
γ ∈ [1/(1 − N), 0). (Observe that we use γ < 0 and 3 − 2γ > 0 when transforming
this requirement.) Using that ξ03 < 0 for all γ < 0, ξ3(γ) < 0 holds surely over the
considered support if it holds at the lower boundary 1/(1− N) or at some other value
γ < 1/(1−N). Given N ≥ 3 it is thus suﬃcient to consider γ = −0.5, where we obtain
ξ3(−0.5) = −1. This concludes the proof that ξ2 > 0 holds also for γ < 0. Q.E.D.
Having shown that ξ2 > 0 holds for all feasible values of γ, i.e., that ξ1(γ,N) is strictly
increasing in N , it remains to show for the lower boundary N = 3 that ξ1(γ, 3) > 0.
We obtain for ξ1(γ, 3) the value ξ4(γ) = 2γ
3 − 18γ2 + 12γ + 16. We show Þrst that
ξ4(γ) > 0 holds for all feasible values γ. By N ≥ 3 it is suﬃcient to show ξ4(γ) > 0
for all values γ ∈ [−0.5, 1]. From the derivative ξ04(γ) = 6γ2 − 36γ + 12 we see that ξ4
increases for γ ∈ [−0.5, 3 − √7) and decreases for γ > 3 − √7, where 3 − √7 ≈ 0.35.
Hence, ξ4(γ) > 0 holds over the considered domain if it is satisÞed at the boundaries,
which holds by ξ4(−0.5) = 5.25 and ξ4(1) = 12.
Having shown that ξ1(γ, N) > 0 holds for all N over the respective domain of γ, it
follows that drC/dγ < 0, and thus dρC/dγ = (N − 1)(1 − r)N−2[drC/dγ] < 0, which
completes the proof. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Derivation of proÞts
We Þrst solve the Bertrand equilibrium in more detail. Summing over all N inverse
demand functions we obtain
NX
i=1
qi =
Nα−PNi=1 pi
1 + γ(N − 1) . (21)
Substituting
P
j 6=i qj = [α − qi − pi]/γ, this yields the demand functions (12). If no
takeover takes place, we obtain the reaction functions
pi = max
½
α+ c
2
− γ(α(N − 1)−
P
j 6=i pj)
2(γ(N − 2) + 1) , 0
¾
and the unique (symmetric) equilibrium prices
pN,B =
α(1− γ) + c(1 + γ(N − 2))
γ(N − 3) + 2 ,
which give rise to (13). If i = 1 is taken over by j, we Þnd that the integrated Þrm
chooses symmetric prices given by the reaction function
pM = max
(
α(1− γ) + c(γ(N − 3) + 1) + γPk∈I\{1,j} pk
2(γ(N − 3) + 1) , 0
)
,
while for outsiders the reaction function of some k ∈ I\{1, j} equals
pU = max
½
α+ c
2
− γ(α(N − 1)−
P
i6=k pi)
2(γ(N − 2) + 1) , 0
¾
.
Solving for the unique price equilibrium, we obtain
pN−1,BM =
α(1− γ)(γ(2N − 3) + 2) + c(γ2(2N2 − 8N + 7) + γ(4N − 9) + 2)
2(γ2(N2 − 5N + 5) + γ(3N − 7) + 2) ,
pN−1,BU =
α(1− γ)(γ(N − 2) + 1) + c(γ2(N2 − 4N + 3) + 2γ(N − 2) + 1)
γ2(N2 − 5N + 5) + γ(3N − 7) + 2 ,
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which give rise to (14) and (15).
Proof of a unique threshold 1/(1−N) < γB < 0
We are now in the position to prove Lemma 2. For the proÞt diﬀerential of outsiders,
which is denoted by πBU in the Bertrand case, it is immediate that π
B
U > 0 holds from
γ ∈ (1/(1−N), 1). Substituting the respective proÞts, we obtain that πBM > 0 holds if
(1− γ)φ1(γ, N)
(γ(N − 1) + 1) (γ(N − 3) + 2)2 (γ2(N2 − 5N + 5) + γ(3N − 7) + 2)2 > 0, with (22)
φ1(γ,N) = γ
3(N(5N2 − 33N + 67)− 43) + γ2(N(17N − 70) + 69) + 16γ(N − 2) + 4
As γ > 1/(1−N) holds by assumption, the sign of the left-hand side of (22) is determined
by φ1(γ, N).
19 Observe Þrst that φ1(1/(1−N),N) = −2(N2−2N−1)/(N−1)3 is negative
for all N . This follows as the quadratic form N2−2N −1 has the two zeros N = 1−√2
and N = 1+
√
2 , where N = 1+
√
2 ≈ 2.41. On the other side, we obtain φ1(0, N) = 4.
This implies existence of a threshold γB(N) < 0 such that φ1(γ
B(N), N) = 0. We show
next that this is the only zero of φ1, which also implies φ1(γ, N) < 0 for γ < γ
B(N) and
φ1(γ,N) > 0 for γ > γ
B(N).
Claim 1. φ1(γ, N) has a unique zero.
Proof. Denoting φ2(γ,N) = dφ1(γ, N)/dγ, we obtain
φ2(γ, N) = γ
2(N(15N2 − 99N + 201)− 129) + γ(34N2 − 140N + 138) + 16N − 32.
(23)
We must now distinguish between N = 3 and N ≥ 4. For N = 3 we obtain φ2(γ, 3) =
−12γ2 + 24γ + 16, which has the two zeros γ = 1− √21/3 and γ = 1 +√21/3, where
19Note also that the denominator is always strictly positive. In particular, for γ > 1/(1−N) it holds
that γ2(N2 − 5N + 5) + γ(3N − 7) + 2 > 0.
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1 − √21/3 ≈ −0.53 and 1 +√21/3 ≈ 2.53. This implies φ2(γ, 3) > 0 for the relevant
domain γ ∈ (−0.5, 1) such that φ1(γ, 3) is strictly increasing and has thus indeed a
unique zero.
Suppose next N ≥ 4 and note Þrst that the factor multiplied by γ2 in (23) is in this
case positive. To see this, denote this factor by φ3(N) = 15N
3 − 99N2 + 201N − 129,
which has the derivative φ03(N) = 45N
2 − 198N + 201. As φ03(N) has the two zeros
N = (33 − 2√21)/15 and N = (33 + 2√21)/15, where (33 + 2√21)/15 ≈ 2.81, and
as φ03(4) = 129, this implies that φ
0
3(N) > 0 for all N ≥ 4. Together with φ3(4) = 51
it then follows that φ3(N) > 0 for all N ≥ 4. We next evaluate φ2(1/(1 − N), N) =
−(3N3−11N2−3N +23)/(N −1)2, which is negative for all N ≥ 4. To see this, denote
φ4(N) = 3N
3 − 11N2 − 3N + 23, which has the derivative φ04(N) = 9N2 − 22N − 3.
As φ04(N) has the two zeros N = (11 − 2
√
37)/9 and N = (11 + 2
√
37)/9, where
(11 + 2
√
37)/9 ≈ 2.57, and as φ04(4) = 53, this implies that φ04(N) > 0 for all N ≥ 4.
Together with φ4(4) = 27 it then follows that φ4(N) > 0 for all N ≥ 4. We can now
determine the behavior of φ2(γ, N) in γ for N ≥ 4. As the factor multiplied by γ2, i.e.,
φ3(N), is strictly positive and as we obtained for the left boundary φ2(1/(1−N), N) < 0,
the quadratic form implies that, as γ increases, φ2 is Þrst negative and then positive. As
a consequence, φ1(γ, N) Þrst decreases and then increases in N . As we already noted
that φ1(1/(1−N), N) < 0, this implies that φ1(γ, N) has indeed a unique zero also for
N ≥ 4. Q.E.D.
Proof that γB is increasing in N
To complete the proof of Lemma 2, we show that γB(N) is increasing in N . As the
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threshold was deÞned as the unique zero of φ1(γ, N) = 0 over γ ∈ [1/(N − 1), 1], we can
obtain monotonicity of γB(N) by implicit diﬀerentiation. For this purpose recall Þrst
from above that φ1 cuts zero from below as we increase γ, i.e., that the derivative satisÞes
at this point φ2(γ
B(N),N) > 0. DeÞne next the derivative w.r.t. N as φ5(γ, N) =
dφ1(γ, N)/dN . The asserted monotonicity of γ
B(N) follows then if φ5(γ
B(N),N) < 0.20
Claim 2. It holds that φ5(γB(N), N) < 0.
Proof. Observe that
φ5(γ, N) = 15γ
3N2 +N(34γ2 − 66γ3)− 70γ2 + 16γ + 67γ3. (24)
To show that φ5(γ
B(N),N) < 0 we proceed indirectly and consider again the problem
φ1(γ,N) = 0, where we now solve for N given some γ. Note that we can restrict
consideration to the values γ where γ = γB(N) is feasible. We show Þrst that this
restricts the domain of γ to values −0.4 < γ < 0. To see this, recall Þrst that we derived
1/(1−N) < γB(N) < 0, which implies the restriction for all N ≥ 4. Moreover, forN = 3
we can show directly that γB(3) > −0.4. The latter follows as φ1(−0.4, 3) = −0.224,
while we have shown that φ1(γ, 3) is strictly increasing in γ and has thus its zero to the
right of γ = −0.4.
Note next that from γ > 1/(1 − N) the solution for φ1(γ,N) = 0 must satisfy
N < (γ− 1)/γ. It holds that φ1(γ, 0) = 4+ 69γ2− 32γ− 43γ3, which is strictly positive
for all γ ≤ 0, while we obtain at the upper boundary φ1(γ, (γ−1)/γ) = 2γ(1−2γ2), which
is negative by γ ∈ (−0.4, 0). We can thus already conclude that for given γ we obtain
at least one zero denoted by N(γ), which satisÞes 0 < N(γ) < (γ − 1)/γ. Moreover, at
20Note that dγB(N)/dN = −φ5(γB(N),N)/φ2(γB(N), N), which shall be positive.
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this zero it follows from the behavior of φ1 at the boundaries N = 0 and N = (γ− 1)/γ
that φ1 cuts zero from above, i.e., that φ5(γ,N(γ)) = 0. If we can show that there is a
unique zero for φ1 in the feasible domain, it must follow that φ5(γ
B(N),N) < 0.
For uniqueness note Þrst that φ5 is a quadratic form inN , where the factor multiplied
by N2 is negative. We obtain φ5(γ, 0) = −70γ2+ 16γ + 67γ3, which is strictly negative.
At the upper boundary we obtain φ5(γ, (γ − 1)/γ) = γ (16γ2 − 3), which has the two
zeros −√3/4 and √3/4, where −√3/4 ≈ −0.43 is strictly smaller than the previously
derived lower boundary −0.4 for γ. As we have shown above that φ5(γ, 0) < 0 and as
15γ3 < 0, which is the factor multiplied with N2 in (24), it thus follows that φ5(γ,N) is
negative for low N and positive for high N . Together with the derived values for φ1 at
the boundaries N = 0 and N = (γ − 1)/γ this implies that φ1 has indeed a unique zero
N(γ) at the considered domain. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Denote the equilibrium probability with which a given Þrm bids the reserve price in
the Bertrand case by rB(γ,N) and recall that rB(γ, N) > 0 for all γ > γB(N) and
rB(γ, N) = 0 for all γ ≤ γB(N), where 1/(1 − N) < γC(N) < 0 and γC(N) is strictly
increasing in N . We show that for all N the probability rB(γ, N), and thus ρB(γ, N), is
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strictly increasing over γ ∈ [γB(N), 1). Substituting πBM and πBU obtains
drB
dγ
=
2 (γ(N − 3) + 2) (N − 2)
[ψ2(γ,N)]
2
ψ1(γ, N), with (25)
ψ1(γ, N) = γ
3
£
6N4 − 48N3 + 130N2 − 143N + 53¤
+γ2
£
24N3 − 136N2 + 236N − 126¤+ γ £30N2 − 108N + 90¤+ 12N − 20,
ψ2(γ, N) = 45γ
3 + 85γ3N2 + 4γ3N4 − 31γ3N3 − 101γ3N − 87γ2N2 − 87γ2 + 16γ2N3
+152γ2N + 20γN2 − 68γN + 56γ + 8N − 12.
As γ(N − 3) + 2 > 0 follows from γ > 1/(1 − N), drB/dγ > 0 holds if ψ1(γ, N) is
strictly positive over γ ∈ (γC(N), 1].21 In what follows, we will show that this holds
also for the extended domain γ ∈ [1/(1 − N), 1]. At the lower boundary we obtain
ψ1(1/(1−N), N) = (3− 3N + 2N2)/(N − 1)3, which is strictly positive for all N ≥ 3.
We show next that ψ1 is strictly increasing over the considered domain, which completes
the proof of Proposition 3.
Diﬀerentiating ψ1 with respect to γ and rearranging terms we obtain
ψ3(γ,N) = dψ1(γ,N)/dγ = γ
2(18N4 − 144N3 + 390N2 − 429N + 159) (26)
+γ(48N3 − 272N2 + 472N − 252) + 30N2 − 108N + 90.
We analyze Þrst the factor multiplied with γ2 in (26), which we denote by ψ4(N) =
18N4 − 144N3 + 390N2 − 429N + 159. While it holds that ψ4(3) = −48, we show that
ψ4(N) > 0 for all N ≥ 4. For this purpose we repeatedly diﬀerentiate ψ4 to obtain
ψ04(N) = 72N
3 − 432N2 + 780N − 429 and ψ004(N) = 216N2 − 864N + 780. Note next
21It can be shown that ψ2(γ, N) 6= 0 holds over the considered domain such that drB/dγ is well
deÞned.
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that ψ004 has two zeros at N = 2 − 16
√
14 and N = 2 + 1
6
√
14, where 2 + 1
6
√
14 ≈ 2. 62,
implying that ψ004(N) > 0 for the considered domain N ≥ 4. As ψ04(4) = 387 it follows
that ψ04(N) > 0 holds as well for N ≥ 4. Finally, as ψ4(4) = 75, this implies that
ψ4(N) > 0 for all N ≥ 4. We are now in the position to prove the monotonicity of ψ1.
Claim. It holds that ψ3(γ,N) > 0.
Proof. Suppose Þrst that N = 3 such that the factor multiplied with γ2 in (26) is
negative. Substituting N = 3 into (26) reveals that the respective quadratic form has
two zeros at γ = −3/4 and γ = 1. As we can restrict consideration to γ ≥ −1/2, it thus
follows that ψ3(γ, 3) > 0 holds over the considered domain of γ.
Suppose next that N ≥ 4 such that the factor multiplied with γ2 in (26) is positive.
Again we can determine the zeros of the respective quadratic from in (26). We show that
the zeros must also be smaller than 1/(1−N), which completes the proof of the Claim.
Observe Þrst that ψ3(1/(1−N), N) = (8N3−18N2+7N−3)/ (N − 1)2. The numerator
of this expression equals 249 at N = 4, while it has the two zeros N = (9 − √39)/12
and N = (9+
√
39)/12, where (9+
√
39)/12 ≈ 1.27. This obtains ψ3(1/(1−N), N) > 0.
Hence, if not both zeros of (26) lie to the left of 1/(1 −N), they must both lie to the
right of 1/(1 −N), implying in particular that the vortex of the quadratic form lies to
the right of 1/(1−N), i.e., that
−2
3
12N3 − 68N2 + 118N − 63
6N4 − 48N3 + 130N2 − 143N + 53 <
1
1−N , (27)
Note that the denominator on the left-hand side in (27) is just equal to ψ4(N)/3, which
was shown to be strictly positive for N ≥ 4. With this information we can transform
(27) to the condition that ψ5(N) = 6N
4−16N3−18N2+67N−33 > 0. To show that this
33
holds, calculate the derivatives ψ05(N) = 24N
3−48N2−36N +67 and ψ005(N) = 72N2−
96N − 36. Note next that ψ005(N) has two zeros N = (4−
√
34)/3 and N = (4+
√
34)/3,
where (4 +
√
34)/3 ≈ 1.64. As thus ψ005(N) > 0 for N ≥ 4 and as ψ05(4) = 691, it holds
that ψ05(N) > 0 for all N ≥ 4. As Þnally ψ5(4) = 459, this proves that ψ5(N) > 0 for all
N ≥ 0. We have thus shown that (27) holds for all N ≥ 4 and that therefore the zeros
of (26) must lie to the left of 1/(1 − N), which completes the proof for ψ3(γ, N) > 0.
Q.E.D.
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Figure 1:  Takeover Probabilities with Bertrand and Cournot ( 3=N ) 
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